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ABSTRACT
Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing systems are characterized by highly
replicated content distributed among nodes with enormous aggre-
gate resources for storage and communication. These properties
alone are not sufficient, however, to render p2p networks immune
to denial-of-service (DoS) attack. In this paper, we study, by means
of analytical modeling and simulation, the resilience of p2p file
sharing systems against DoS attacks, in which malicious nodes re-
spond to queries with erroneous responses. We consider the file-
targeted attacks in current use in the Internet, and we introduce a
new class of p2p-network-targeted attacks.
In file-targeted attacks, the attacker puts a large number of cor-
rupted versions of a single file on the network. We demonstrate
that the effectiveness of these attacks is highly dependent on the
clients’ behavior. For the attacks to succeed over the long term,
clients must be unwilling to share files, slow in removing corrupted
files from their machines, and quick to give up downloading when
the system is under attack.
In network-targeted attacks, attackers respond to queries for any
file with erroneous information. Our results indicate that these at-
tacks are highly scalable: increasing the number of malicious nodes
yields a hyperexponential decrease in system goodput, and a mod-
erate number of attackers suffices to cause a near-collapse of the
entire system. The key factors inducing this vulnerability are (i)
hierarchical topologies with misbehaving “supernodes,” (ii) high
path-length networks in which attackers have increased opportu-
nity to falsify control information, and (iii) power-law networks
in which attackers insert themselves into high-degree points in the
graph.
Finally, we consider the effects of client counter-strategies such
as randomized reply selection, redundant and parallel download,
and reputation systems. Some counter-strategies (e.g., randomized
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reply selection) provide considerable immunity to attack (reducing
the scaling from hyperexponential to linear), yet significantly hurt
performance in the absence of an attack. Other counter-strategies
yield little benefit (or penalty). In particular, reputation systems
show little impact unless they operate with near perfection.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Security and Protection]: Denial of Service;
C.2.2 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network Proto-
cols
General Terms
Algorithms, Performance, Theory, Security
Keywords
Peer-to-peer, denial of service, file pollution, network-targeted at-
tacks
1. INTRODUCTION
Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing networks can be subjected to in-
tense Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. For example, it has been re-
ported that the music industry places false content on p2p networks
used for trading copyrighted music [3, 7, 16]. Likewise, record-
ing artists have released false content on p2p networks [7, 16, 21].
On one hand, one may expect that p2p file-sharing systems are ro-
bust to DoS attacks, because popular data is highly replicated and
system resources such as bandwidth and storage are immense and
widely distributed. On the other hand, one may expect a p2p net-
work whose topology is characterized by a power-law graph to be
vulnerable to attack [2].
The contributions of this paper are to identify the key factors that
affect the DoS resilience of a p2p file sharing system and to quan-
tify the impact of these factors via analytical modeling and sim-
ulation. These factors include protocol properties (e.g., hierarchy
via “supernodes”), graph properties (e.g., power-law vs. k-regular
graphs), client counter-DoS strategies (e.g., parallel download and
randomization strategies), and user-behavior factors (e.g., willing-
ness to share files and persistence in downloading a file when the
system is under a DoS attack). Thus, our findings provide criti-
cal guidelines for DoS-resilient design of p2p architectures, proto-
cols, and client counter-strategies by characterizing attack scalabil-
ity and even “collapse points” associated with each design decision.
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Scope of Attacks. We consider known file-targeted attacks tar-
geted against popular files [7, 16], and we introduce a new class of
more devastating attacks against entire p2p file sharing systems.
In file-targeted DoS attacks, a malicious node advertises a cor-
rupted (polluted) copy of a given file, and distributes this copy when
chosen by another peer. Both measurements [7, 16] and anecdo-
tal evidence [3, 21] indicate that the music industry is depositing
large volumes of polluted files into p2p file sharing systems such as
KaZaA. Moreover, companies such as Overpeer1 or Retsnap2 pub-
licly offer their pollution-based DoS services to the entertainment
industry for protecting copyrighted materials.
Next, we develop and study a new class of attacks designed to
collapse a p2p network’s goodput. In such an attack, a malicious
peer modifies replies to queries for any file, before it forwards them
to the client. In a “false reply attack”, the malicious peer points the
client to itself. When the client then requests a download from
the malicious peer, it presents a corrupted copy of the file, forc-
ing a repeated request and download in order for the client to ob-
tain the true file. Alternatively, in a “slow node attack,” the mali-
cious peer points the client to a slow or overloaded peer with the
goal of increasing the client’s delay. Such attacks are particularly
malicious as they consume resources in both the data and control
planes. Moreover, we show that false-reply attacks possess an ex-
traordinary scaling behavior, in which the attacker can significantly
degrade the performance of the entire p2p system while controlling
only a small fraction of nodes.
Even a small percentage of nodes in a large-scale system can
represent 100s or 1000s of hosts. We note two mechanisms by
which attackers can control numerous hosts. First, the attacker can
deploy all malicious nodes itself at a single or multiple Internet
Data Centers.3 A second way to launch an attack is by subverting
peers via a “trojan horse” program that serves corrupted content.
Trojan horse programs are already common on both the Internet
(e.g., those spread via email viruses, worms, and the web) as well
in p2p systems [23].4 This latter scenario could be employed by
“resource-poor” malicious users who wish to deny service to oth-
ers.
Modeling File Targeted Attacks. To study the resilience of p2p
networks to file-targeted attacks, we develop a discrete-time model
that enables us to study the spread of good and bad copies. We
initially assume a fully cooperative p2p environment. We demon-
strate that in this case the pollution attack has a serious scalability
limitation, and is unable to prevent the spreading of good copies in
the system. Without full cooperation, however, user-behavior fac-
tors, such as (i) slow and incomplete removal of corrupted copies,
(ii) unwillingness to share downloaded files, and (iii) lack of persis-
tence in downloading files when the system is under attack, prevent
good copies from spreading in the system and render the attack far
more effective.
Modeling p2p Network Attacks. Network-based attacks are
dependent on the network topology. We model a two-level hierar-
1http://www.overpeer.com
2http://www.retsnap.info
3While the costs of such a cluster along with sufficient bandwidth
to serve the false content could be 100s of thousands of dollars,
such amounts can be quite modest in certain scenarios. For exam-
ple, in the context of networks used to trade copyrighted material,
the RIAA estimates $4B/year in lost revenue due to mp3 trading
and spends an estimated $17M/year in legal fees.
4For example, reference [23] describes how many p2p users were
thwarted by a spyware program bundled to feign being third-party
advertising software. The application installed even if users opted
not to install it.
chy, a  -regular graph, and a power-law graph. Two-level hierar-
chy topologies occur in systems with supernodes such as Gnutella
and KaZaA.  -regular graphs arise in structured p2p networks such
as CAN [19], Chord [19], Pastry [20], Tapestry [13], and Kadem-
lia [17]. Finally, power-law graphs can arise in a number of ways
(see [1]). In particular, they occur as a protocol objective in Freenet [9],
and in networks in which the access link capacity has a heavy-tail
distribution and a node’s degree is made proportional to its access
link capacity. We also model the effects of different client counter-
DoS strategies such as random and redundant reply selection and
reputation systems.
Our findings for modeling network-based attacks are as follows.
First, the model characterizes how the additional protocol functions
of supernodes yield significant leverage to DoS attackers that ob-
tain supernode status (in today’s Gnutella, nodes self-declare them-
selves as supernodes by advertising a high access link bandwidth).
Second, non-hierarchical  -regular graphs incur a different scaling
for resilience to attackers. The “collapse” points for such graphs
typically occur only with very large path lengths (e.g., greater than
10), which occur either in very large scale systems or in networks
that route via long paths specifically to achieve anonymity, e.g., as
in [6, 9]. Third, we find that power-law graphs present an acute
vulnerability to DoS in cases in which malicious nodes are able to
insert themselves in the high-degree “hubs” of the graph. While
vulnerability of power-law graphs to DoS attack and failure is well
established, e.g., [2, 9], no prior study has explored a scenario in
which highly-connected nodes participate in the attack.
Finally, the analytical model characterizes the impact of the client’s
reply-selection policy. The worst policy under attack is the “best
peer policy,” in which a client selects the peer advertising the best
performance. Because attackers can easily falsify performance in-
formation, a victim that “believes” reported information is only
successful when no false replies are received. Furthermore, our
analytical model characterizes system performance in the presence
of non-perfect reputation systems, and under various client reply-
selection policies. We show that reputation systems with even ex-
tremely small inaccuracies (incorrect belief that a malicious node is
non-malicious or vice versa) are unable to improve the performance
of different variants of the “best peer policy.”
Simulation Experiments. The key result of our simulations is
the characterization of the tradeoffs between performance of the
system in the absence of an attack and its resilience during an at-
tack. Experiments confirm the extreme vulnerability of the “best
peer policy.” They also demonstrate that if the users instead select
their download source randomly, the system becomes far more re-
silient (goodput decreases only linearly with the number of attack-
ers), but at the expense of a substantial performance penalty in the
absence of attacks. This tradeoff between resilience against attacks
and performance in the absence of attacks is quite pronounced. For
instance, for the particular parameters used in our simulation, a
“best peer” strategy leads to a virtual system collapse when the at-
tack can commandeer 2.5% of the supernodes. In contrast, for the
same set of parameters, choosing a random peer from the received
query responses prevents collapse even under a high number of at-
tackers. This resilience comes at the expense, however, of a seven-
fold increase in average download time in the absence of an attack.
We next present a brief background on p2p systems. In Sections
3 and 4 we present the file- and network-targeted DoS scenarios. In
Section 5 we present our analytical model and in Section 6 simula-
tions. Finally, in Section 7 we conclude.
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2. BACKGROUND ON PEER-TO-PEER
SYSTEMS
P2p systems can be broadly classified as structured or unstruc-
tured based on whether there is any inherent structure in the system
that can be exploited to efficiently locate files.
In unstructured p2p systems such as Gnutella,5 a given file can be
stored at any node in the system. The original version of Gnutella
used scoped flooding to locate a file. While this method is highly
robust and flexible, it is not scalable. To address the scalability
problem, newer versions of Gnutella as well as other unstructured
p2p systems such as KaZaA6 use a two-level hierarchy. The first
level of the hierarchy consists of leaf nodes, and the second level
consists of more powerful nodes, called supernodes. Each leaf node
is connected to one or more supernodes. A supernode maintains a
directory of all files stored at its leaf nodes. When a leaf node
queries a file, it sends the query to its supernode. If the supernode
knows the location of a file copy (i.e., if one of its leaf nodes stores
the file), it sends the answer back to the requester. Otherwise, the
supernode floods the query to other supernodes. Since the number
of supernodes is much smaller than the total number of nodes in
the system, such hierarchical p2p systems are more scalable than
the original Gnutella.
Freenet [8, 9] is an unstructured p2p network whose aim is to
provide anonymity and censorship resistance. Each file in Freenet
is assigned a unique ID by hashing the file content. Each node
maintains a routing table consisting of the IDs of the files stored
locally and at the neighbor nodes. When a new file is inserted, the
file is routed according to its ID and stored at all nodes along the
path. Similarly, when a file is retrieved, the file is copied along the
path from the source to the requester. This makes Freenet highly
resistant to censorship, as it is hard if not impossible to locate all
copies of a specific file. Furthermore, trying to locate a file will
result in the file being copied at even more nodes.
Structured peer-to-peer networks such as CAN [19], Chord [19],
Pastry [20], Tapestry [13], and Kademlia [17] partition a global
ID space across all nodes in the system. As a result, each node
becomes responsible for a chunk of the ID space. Each file is as-
sociated with a unique ID, for example, by hashing the file content
or the file title into the ID space. A file is then stored at the node
responsible for the file’s ID. Alternatively, a file can be stored at an
arbitrary node in the system, as long as a pointer to the file is stored
at the node responsible for the file’s ID. In either case, one needs to
find this node in order to retrieve the file. Thus, the basic operation
in a structured peer-to-peer network is: given an ID, find the node
responsible for that ID. Structured p2p networks are very efficient
in locating such a node. In general, they can find the node respon-
sible for a given ID by contacting only      nodes, where 
is the number of nodes in the system.
Structella [4] is a hybrid proposal based on Pastry. Like the orig-
inal Gnutella, Structella uses flooding to locate files, but does so in
a more efficient way. In particular, Structella uses the underlying
structure of Pastry to send no more than one flood message per vir-
tual link. This helps to reduce the flooding cost by a factor of   ,
where   is the average degree of a node in Pastry. In this paper,
we assume that the replies are sent back to the requester using the
Pastry routing protocol.
3. FILE-TARGETED DOS ATTACKS
It has been shown recently that the music industry has under-
5http://gnutella.wego.com
6http://www.kazaa.com
taken serious efforts to combat file sharing of copyrighted content
by depositing large volumes of corrupted (polluted) files into p2p
systems such as KaZaA [7, 16]. In such an attack, a malicious node
advertises a corrupted file, and eventually distributes this copy if it
is chosen by another peer. Unlike for network-targeted attacks, the
p2p network topology does not play a role in the effectiveness of a
file-targeted attack. Instead, the user-behavior factors such as will-
ingness to share files, speediness in removing corrupted files, and
persistence in downloading files under attack determine the spread
of polluted files. We present a simple model to evaluate the file-
sharing dynamics under this “pollution” attack.
In particular, we model the number of peers that have a good
(non-corrupted) copy of a particular file, and the number of peers
that have a bad (corrupted) copy of the same file. Indeed, there
is evidence that the music industry protects only certain audio and
video files, usually the new releases [7, 16], and thus our goal is to
explore the dynamics in sharing these files. In addition, the total
number of nodes considered in our system model is only a subset
of nodes that can be present in a p2p network.
The modeling assumptions are as follows. First, upon a query for
a file, the user is presented with the list of all nodes that advertise
that particular file. Second, each node can advertise only a single
copy of a specific file. This policy prevents a single malicious node
from performing large-scale attacks against a certain file, and it
can easily be enforced through the search mechanism. Finally, we
assume that a user picks a random file from the list. In light of
recent DoS attacks against p2p file sharing systems, this is a likely
counter-DoS method, and we show in Sections 4.3 and 6.4 that
this is indeed the most successful client counter-strategy among the
ones that we consider.
3.1 Spreading the Pollution
While users have a clear incentive to keep a good copy on their
machines, it is possible that a bad copy remains on a non-malicious
user’s machine for a certain amount of time. If a corrupted file
is not immediately inspected and removed after the download, it
remains on the machine for a certain amount of time, and during
that time it can be downloaded by other users. Moreover, there is
evidence that downloads in p2p file-sharing systems are often made
in the background and that content is typically examined later [11].
Denote by  the total number of users that are either interested
in downloading a certain file or already have a copy (either good or
bad). Next, denote by  	 and 
	 the respective number of peers that
have good and bad copies of the file at time interval  (a time inter-
val corresponds to one hour). Further, denote by 	 the interest-rate
factor that determines how many of the interested nodes actually
send a query for the file during the -th hour. Then, the number of
nodes that have a good copy of the file in hour    is
 	   	    
	  	 	

	

	
 

	 
(1)
In Equation (1),   
	   	 is the number of nodes that are
interested in obtaining the file, but still do not have a copy of it.





is the probability that the users that have sent a query in the
-th hour download a good copy of the file. Next, define 	 as the
number of nodes that are “infected” with a corrupted copy during
the -th hour as

	
   

	
 
	
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
(2)
The above term is similar to the one from Equation (1), with the
difference of the factor 




, which is the probability that the file
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downloaded in the -th hour is polluted. Next, denote by    the
probability that an infected node removes a corrupted copy after 
hours, and denote by  the maximum number of hours for which a
corrupted copy can remain on the user’s machine. Then, the num-
ber of polluted nodes in hour    will be

	   
	  	 


  
   	 

(3)
where 

  
    . Equation (3) provides a relationship between
the number of polluted nodes in two consecutive hours. On one
hand, the number of polluted nodes in hour    increases by the
number of nodes that get infected during the -th hour, as defined
in Equation (2). On the other hand, the number of polluted nodes
in hour    decreases by the number of peers that are “cleansed”
during the -th hour. These peers are represented by the last term
of Equation (3), which sums over the fractions of peers that were
infected in the past, while cleansed during the -th hour. For exam-
ple,    	 is the number of peers that are both infected and cleansed
during the -th hour;   		  is the number of peers infected during
hour    hour while cleansed during the -th hour, and so on.
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Figure 1: Spreading corrupted and non-corrupted copies
Figure 1 shows the spreading of both good and bad files in a sys-
tem with   
   interested nodes, a large number of mali-
cious nodes 
    
, and a small number of initial good copies,


 . The interest-rate factor is set to 1/24 such that each peer
interested in obtaining this file attempts to download it on average
once per 24 hours. Hence, not all clients instantaneously download
a copy of a file, and thus the sum of the two fractions in Figure 1 is
less than 1. Next, we set the parameter  to 48 such that a polluted
copy can remain at most 48 hours on a user’s machine. In addition,
the probabilities   	 are all equal such that the lifetime of infected
machines is uniformly distributed between one and 48 hours. The
fraction of polluted copies in this scenario monotonically increases
up to the maximum lifetime of infection, because the “infection”
parameter 	 of Equation (3) is larger than the “cleansing” param-
eter 

  
 


	  of the same equation. The relationship be-
tween the two factors changes after 48 hours, when the number of
polluted copies decreases. Furthermore, good copies spread signif-
icantly slower at the beginning because the probability to download
a good copy ( 
	

	
) is initially very low. As time evolves, the num-
ber of good copies increases, and so does the probability to down-
load a good copy. Eventually, all non-malicious clients (90% of all
clients interested in hosting this file) manage to download a good
copy of the file. At this point,   
	   	 of Equation (1) becomes
zero, and the system reaches steady state.
Measurements from [7, 16] show, however, that the ratio of pol-
luted to non-polluted copies in the KaZaA network remains rela-
tively constant over time, and that good copies do not manage to
spread. We analyze in detail below how this behavior can come
about.
3.2 Cooperation and Persistence
There are two fundamental reasons that prevent files targeted by
the pollution attack from spreading in the network. First, not all
peers are willing to share the files that they download. Second,
a user’s interest for downloading newly released audio/video files
quickly decreases [11]. Next, we demonstrate how both of these
effects can significantly improve the success of the pollution attack.
A previous study has shown that p2p users in general are greedy,
i.e., most users consume data, but provide little in return [22]. This
behavior is even more prevalent due to recent legal actions against
p2p systems (e.g., against KaZaA [14]). Denote by    the proba-
bility that a user is not willing to share a good copy of a file once it
has downloaded it, and denote by  
	
(P stands for public copies)
the number of users at time step  that are willing to share a good
copy. Then, the number of good public copies increases as


	 
 

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(4)
Equation (4) is similar to Equation (1), with the difference that the
total number of copies at time interval  is expressed as a function of
good public copies ( 	   
 
). Also, the increase in the number
of good public copies is reduced by the factor  

, as compared
to Equation (1). It can be shown that equations similar to Equations
(2) and (3) govern the spreading of polluted copies.
In addition to clients being unwilling to share files, the actual in-
terest (request) rate for a particular file influences the spreading of
both good and bad copies. A measurement study [11] indicates that
the interest rate for new popular objects (those typically targeted by
the pollution attack) tends to decrease significantly after only a few
weeks. While no study explicitly measures the user behavior in the
presence of a file-targeted attack, it is reasonable to assume that
the interest rate for a certain file decreases even faster under a pol-
lution attack, because users become frustrated after downloading
bogus copies. Here, we evaluate a simple linear interest-rate func-
tion 	     	
	



. This means that, on average, 15%
of users give up after the first day, another 15% after the second
day, and so on. While not representative of an actual scenario, our
main goal here is to illustrate the impact of users’ persistence on
the effectiveness of the attack.
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Figure 2: The impact of users’ greediness and persistence
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Figure 2 depicts the effects of user greediness and persistence on
the rate at which good copies spread. All parameters are the same
as in the previous example. In addition, we set the probability that
a user is willing to share the file to 
 
(      
 
), while
the interest-rate is modeled with the linear function above. First,
the decline of the number of bad copies in Figure 2 is more sharp
than the decline in Figure 1, which is due to the low persistence
level. After realizing that they have downloaded a polluted copy of
a file, users may give up and make no further attempts to download
the file. Hence, the probability to get re-infected decreases, and so
does the number of infected nodes. The key point, however, is that
if users get discouraged quickly, good copies are never success-
fully distributed in the network. In our scenario, the interest rate
factor 	 of Equation (4) converges to zero approximately beyond
180 hours, forcing the system to reach a quite unsatisfactory steady
state.7 Interestingly, measurements from KaZaA [7, 16] show that
the number of good and bad copies for newly released files does
not change much over time, indicating that the network operates in
a “depressed” mode (like the one in Figure 2 beyond 180 hours), in
which clients do not manage to increase the number of good copies.
In summary, the main reason for the success of file-targeted at-
tacks applied in today’s p2p systems is the user behavior. In par-
ticular, the key factors are (i) negligence in cleansing the machines
infected by polluted copies, (ii) users’ unwillingness to share down-
loaded files, and (iii) a low persistence level. However, such an
attack is unable to prevent the spreading of good copies in a fully
cooperative p2p environments (that do not exhibit the above (i)-(iii)
behavior) with a sufficient interest rate for a certain file, as indicated
in Figure 1.
Thus, in the rest of the paper, we anticipate the next step in the
“arms race” between the attackers and defenders, and treat a class
of more sophisticated DoS and counter-DoS strategies.
4. NETWORK-TARGETED DOS ATTACKS
We present a class of DoS attacks targeted against entire p2p
networks. The key differences between such attacks and the file-
targeted (pollution) attack are as follows. First, in network-targeted
attacks, an attacker responds to all queries, whereas in the pollution
attack it only replies to queries for a set of targeted files that are
being protected. Second, in network-targeted attacks, the attacker
is able to intercept a query for a downstream node and falsify the
reply on the reverse path. Hence, a query that follows a path with
even a single malicious node gets a response pointing to a bogus
file.
4.1 System Model
We consider a p2p file sharing system in which the interaction
between the clients and system occurs in two steps:
Query. The client queries the system for a particular file, and
the system returns a number of replies. Each reply contains the lo-
cation of a copy of the queried file, and information about the node
storing the copy. Without loss of generality, we assume that a reply
contains (1) the IP address of the node storing a copy of the queried
file, and (2) sufficient information for the client to calculate the es-
timated time to download the file from this node, e.g., the node’s
queue length (ideally including file sizes), the maximum number of
simultaneous uploads, and the access link bandwidth.
Download. The client selects a node among the nodes contained
in the replies it has received, and contacts that node to download
7While we do not consider client’s arrival and departure dynamics,
shorter lifetimes of nodes can further slow down spread of good
copies.
the file. Clients may employ a number of selection policies as de-
scribed below.
In the rest of the paper, we refer to the first phase of the interac-
tion as the control plane, and the second phase as the data plane.
4.2 Attacker Strategy
An attacker can interfere with both the control plane and the data
plane. In this section and in the rest of the paper we consider the
following scenario: Upon receiving any query, a malicious node
forwards it normally. Upon being requested to forward any reply,
however, the malicious node modifies the reply with false informa-
tion. We consider two cases:
False reply attack. The attacker falsifies the reply by replacing
the replying peer’s identity with its own and by advertising a very
low expected transfer delay. This strategy allows the attacker to re-
spond to requests for files for which it has no or limited information
(e.g., the attacker does not know the exact file name). If selected by
the client, the node transfers a corrupted file.
Slow node attack. The attacker points the client to a non-malicious
but low-bandwidth peer, and lies about that peer’s capabilities, i.e.,
it changes the advertised delay of slow nodes. It also drops replies
from fast nodes.
In both cases, we assume that the attacker cannot respond to
queries directly, but rather must wait for legitimate replies from
downstream in order to modify them. This is because, typically,
queries to p2p networks are not very precise, i.e., they result in
multiple files in the result set, which is ultimately filtered by the
user when making the final download decision. We consider that
attackers cannot modify the query forwarding algorithm executed
by a legitimate node. Thus, a query that follows a path consisting
only of legitimate nodes always generates a correct reply.
The space of possible attacks in a p2p systems is immense. We
focus on a limited class of attacks that aim to attack system-wide
performance. Even within this class of attacks, we do not consider
all possibilities. For example, we do not explore attacks on the
routing protocol, that are treated elsewhere [5].
4.3 Client Strategy
In response to a query, a client receives a set of replies pointing to
different nodes. The main decision that the client needs to make is
which one of these nodes to ask for a copy of the file. We consider
the following selection strategies:
Best. The client selects the node that advertises the best perfor-
mance, i.e., the node with the lowest estimated delay (the node’s
queue length times the file size times the maximum number of si-
multaneous uploads divided by the access link bandwidth).
Random. The client selects a random node, independent of the
nodes’ advertised resources.
Redundant best. The client performs redundant downloads from
the C nodes with the lowest estimated delay. Once the first down-
load finishes and the content is verified for correctness, the other
downloads are stopped.
Redundant random. The client performs redundant downloads
from  peers, but chooses those  peers randomly.
File Chunking. The file is sliced into  chunks, and the client
downloads a chunk from each of  different peers in parallel. File
chunking is already used in today’s systems to improve response
time for downloading large files. Selection of these peers can be
best or random.
Reputation Systems. We consider a simplified model in which
a reputation system is employed to mark peers as malicious or non-
malicious. We do not attempt to model the specifics of the protocol
beyond the fact that it is imperfect, i.e., it has a non-zero false-
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negative and false-positive probability. This abstraction enables us
to evaluate how accurate the reputation system must be in order
for the system to be resilient to DoS attack. We do not attempt to
study key challenges for reputation systems such as assurance of
persistent identity, prevention of collusion for false accusation or
false praise, binge bad behavior after good behavior, etc. [10, 12,
15, 18].
Detection. For the download of a complete file, we assume
that the client can detect whether a file is corrupted only after it has
downloaded the entire file. The client then selects a different peer
from the response list and downloads the file again. For file chunk-
ing, we consider two possibilities. First, as an upper bound on
performance, we consider the case in which the client can detect a
corrupt chunk as soon as it receives it, and immediately downloads
that chunk from an alternate node from the set of nodes that had
replied to the query. Second, as a lower bound on performance,
we consider the case in which the client must first download all
chunks before inferring that the file is corrupt. At this time, the
client is not able to infer which chunk is corrupt, only that the file
is corrupt. Subsequently, the client downloads all chunks from new
peers from the set of replies to the original query, and we evaluate
this approach later in simulations.
Finally, like the space of attacks, the space of possible defenses is
also quite large, and our scope is limited to the above strategies. De-
spite these limitations, our study provides a key step towards under-
standing and quantifying the vulnerability of p2p systems against
network-targeted attacks.
5. MODELING RESILIENCE TO
NETWORK-TARGETED ATTACKS
We develop simple models to evaluate the impact of a collection
of DoS nodes on p2p system performance focusing on three issues:
hierarchy via supernodes,  -regular topologies and path length, and
power-law graphs.
5.1 Supernodes and Hierarchy
Our objective here is to develop a model that isolates the impact
of malicious supernodes on a system’s DoS resilience. In particu-
lar, supernodes have increased control plane functions that can be
exploited by an attacker with the following properties relevant here:
(1) requests and replies are routed via an inter-connected mesh of
supernodes, and (2) supernodes reply to queries on behalf of their
leaf nodes. Consequently, a malicious supernode can exploit all of
these properties to more successfully spread false information in
the false reply attack described in Section 4.
Denote the number of peers in the system by  , the number
of supernodes by   , and the number of malicious supernodes by
, with       . Moreover, to provide a lower bound on
the damage of the attack, we consider fully replicated content in
which all nodes store all content. This maximizes the number of
“true replies” to a query. Consequently, in this scenario each query
results in  responses and a particular response is false if the reply
has been generated or forwarded by a malicious supernode.
Consider a graph in which each supernode is equally likely to be
chosen for each hop, and the path length has  supernode hops,
where  is a random variable. A response is valid only if all 
nodes visited are not malicious so that
       

 
 	   

 

  

 


(5)
and     


          . The first term
is the probability that a peer is directly connected to a malicious
supernode (and hence all its requests fail) and the second term is the
probability that the request fails given that the peer is not directly
attached to a malicious supernode times the probability that a node
is not directly attached to a malicious supernode.
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Figure 3: The Role of DoS Supernodes
Figure 3 depicts the probability of receiving a true reply as a
function of the fraction of malicious supernodes   and for a
constant  . Thus, with 0 attackers, 100% of replies are truthful,
whereas with 10% of malicious supernodes the probability is re-
duced to 81% for   , which represents a fully interconnected
mesh of supernodes such that all paths are one hop. For longer
paths and   , the probability of receiving a truthful reply for
10% malicious supernodes is reduced to 65.6% and for   
, to
53.1%. Thus, the attack is increasingly powerful with larger  as
DoS nodes have increased opportunity to intercept queries.
An example scenario with a ratio of supernodes to non-supernodes
of 10, a path length of   , and a network size of  100,000
peers,  1,000 attacking supernodes (10% of supernodes) pro-
duces a truthful reply probability of 59%. Thus, such an attack
indeed has a “multiplier effect” in which 1% of bad nodes reduces
truthful replies by 41%. While this example attack may appear to
be relatively mild at first glance, we show in Section 6 that the “pos-
itive feedback” of repeated retransmission induced by such false
replies can indeed have a significant effect on successful file trans-
fer delay and system goodput.
5.2  -Regular Topologies and Path Length
Our goal in this section is two fold. First, we aim to model
structured peer-to-peer networks such as CAN [19], Chord [19],
Pastry [20], and Tapestry [13], whose underlying topology can be
approximated by a  -regular graph, where   is usually     .
Second, we want to explore the effects of the path length on the
robustness of such networks. Typically, the length of the path in
these systems is     , but it can be significantly larger when
users desire anonymity. Indeed, as described in Section 2 and refer-
ence [6], anonymous communication inherently requires high hop
counts in the absence of a trusted third party anonymization service.
Let  be the number of malicious nodes, and  a random vari-
able denoting the number of hops on the path. Under these assump-
tions and with each node being equally likely to be on the search
path, failure occurs if any node along the path is malicious such
that
   



	
   





    

(6)
In examples from Freenet with a 100,000 peer network,  has
mean 10, and first and third quartiles of 3 and 40 [8]. For Fig-
ure 4 we consider  to be constant, taking on values of 3, 10, or
40. The figure and Equation (6) clearly indicate that such high hop
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Figure 4: High Path Length
counts provide strong leverage for attackers, even though attackers
no longer have the leverage of being a supernode in this scenario.
For example, an attacker with 10% of nodes can reduce the truthful-
reply probability to nearly 0 when  is 40. In comparison with the
supernode case in which 1% of total nodes are malicious, with a
flat network structure, even a high hop count of    reduces the
truthful-reply probability quite mildly to 90%.
5.3 Power Law Topologies
Above we considered graphs in which each node is equally likely
to be on the path of a query response. However, attacks can be
far more devastating for graphs with power law structure if ma-
licious nodes are able to insert themselves into the highly con-
nected “hubs” of the graph. Given that the existence of power law
graphs in p2p networks has been previously established (e.g., refer-
ence [8]), our objective here is to explore the extent to which such
topologies impact a system’s DoS resilience. While fault tolerance
and resilience to external DoS attacks has been studied for power
law graphs in [2, 9], here, we consider highly connected nodes to
be participating in the attack.
To study this effect, consider a network consisting of  nodes,
where node  has degree   	. Then we have that for random lookup
operations, the expected number of lookups that traverse node  is
at most proportional to its degree   	. This observation is justified
as follows: Consider a structured p2p network like Chord, Pastry,
or Tapestry. Let  be the graph representing the network topology.
Without loss of generality assume that nodes are ranked by their
degree where node  has the highest degree and node  has the
lowest degree. Further assume that each node covers a range of ID
space proportional to its degree. Construct a new graph  as fol-
lows. Replace each node  in  with  	    	  virtual nodes.
Then each virtual node in  routes approximately the same num-
ber of lookups. By this argument, node  in the original graph 
will route a number of lookups proportional to the number of its
virtual nodes, i.e.,   	  .
Note that the model is an approximation in that a node with high
degree will actually route less than its share since a lookup in 

may traverse virtual nodes belonging to the same node in  , in
which case the corresponding node in  will be counted multiple
times. Moreover, if each node in  covers the same ID space then
a node will route even less than its fair share of lookups.
Continuing with the model, we consider the case that the degrees
of nodes in  have a Pareto distribution,
 
  
   	



 (7)
where     represents the number of nodes with degree
greater or equal to ,  is the shape parameter, and   is a constant.
Then the degree   of the nodes with the highest rank  is   
   	 
 

, where       
 . Moreover, the sum of the degrees
of the highest ranked  nodes is then         


 
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Figure 5: DoS in Power-law Networks
Thus, in contrast to Sections 5.1 and 5.2 in which each node
(malicious or not) is equally likely to be a hop on the query path,
here the node degree weights the likelihood of a node being on the
path according to its degree. Moreover, we consider the border-
line scenario for the attacker in which malicious peers are placed
as the highest ranked  nodes in the graph. Then for    (a fully
connected mesh) the expected fraction of lookups that will be com-
promised is bounded above by       
 
 

 



 





 
.
Figure 5 depicts numerical results for this case and a 10,000 node
network and indicates that compared to the “  ” curve in Fig-
ure 3, the attack is far more severe. Most notably, all curves drop
sharply with even a small percentage of attacking nodes, as even the
first malicious node is the most connected node and has substantial
opportunity to spread false information. The extent to which the at-
tack scales is a function of the Pareto shape parameter with a larger
 indicating a heavier-tailed node degree and a more severe attack.
Of course, in practice, queries traverse multiple hops so that the
performance under    is most relevant. Here we consider a flat
node structure (no supernodes) as in Equation (6) and again assume
that a requests visit exactly  hops and that the probability to visit a
node is proportional to its degree. With the highest ranked  nodes
being malicious, the probability of false information is given by
    
ﬀ
 
  
  ﬁ
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(8)
Unfortunately, Equation (8) indicates that a 10,000 node net-
work with 4-hop paths obtains devastating performance even under
a modest number of attacking nodes. For example, for   

 and
1% malicious nodes the truthful-reply rate is only 

ﬂ%.
Finally, note that if the joint effect of power law graphs together
with high path lengths for anonymity or supernodes for scalability
would make the system even more vulnerable to attack as indicated
by Equations (5), (6), and (8).
5.4 Client Strategies
We next explore client counter-DoS strategies that play a crucial
role in relating the probability of receiving false vs. true informa-
tion to the probability of a failed vs. successful download (denoted
by     and  ﬃ       , respectively).
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5.4.1 Success Under False Information
We consider the same system model in which the attacker returns
bogus replies. Out of  replies to a query, the p2p user chooses to
download a single file, or multiple files simultaneously, depending
on the policy described below. Upon downloading a file (either
good or bad), the user sends the query for another file. In other
words, we assume independence between successive queries.
Select Perfectly. At one extreme, if the victim was able to know
which replies are false via omniscience, then a download fails only
if all received information is false. Thus,  ﬃ    
rendering  ﬃ quite close to one for large system sizes. How-
ever, as such a policy is infeasible in practice, we consider more
realistic policies as follows.
Select “Best”. A trusting user will select the “best” reply ac-
cording to criteria such as advertised link bandwidth or expected
download time. Unfortunately, this policy is at the other end of
the extreme for yielding success as attackers will falsify such infor-
mation. Consequently, the success probability in this case is given
by
 ﬃ      

 (9)
quite close to 0 for large system sizes. Equation (9) indicates that
the download is going to be successful only if all replies to a query
are correct. Otherwise, if at least one is bogus, that one is selected,
and causes an unsuccessful download.
Select Randomly. When users are aware that the system is under
attack, they are less trusting of advertised performance measures.
If they consequently select randomly among the replies, then we
simply have
 ﬃ      

(10)
Select Redundantly. If users download  redundant copies in
order to protect against false information, then the probability of
successful download is
 ﬃ       

(11)
Select Best Redundantly. When users select the  “best” ad-
vertised download times, the probability of successful download
becomes
 ﬃ 
 


	
    
 	
  
	

(12)
Equation (12) indicates that in the “best redundant” scenario, the
download is going to be successful only if there exists at least one
truthful reply within the top  replies.
File chunking. For file chunking, the above expressions directly
apply to each chunk, assuming that the peer for each chunk is cho-
sen independently. Denoting  ﬃ  as the probability of suc-
cessful download for a chunk, as computed above, the probabil-
ity of successful download for the entire file becomes  ﬃ  
 ﬃ



for a file sliced into  chunks. Thus, without attack-
ers, file chunking improves performance as it increases download
throughput. Yet under attack, this improvement is countered by a
reduction in the probability of a successful download.
Figure 6 depicts the impact of reply-selection policies and rep-
utation systems on the successful-download probability as a func-
tion of the false-reply probability. We set   
. For the
time being, we focus on the results for the network without a rep-
utation system, i.e., the “thin” curves of Figure 6. On one hand,
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Figure 6: Reply-Selection Policies and Reputation Systems
the “best” policies (e.g., Equations (9) and (12)) are highly vul-
nerable to very small false-reply probabilities. Indeed, if a user
always chooses to download one or more files with best-advertised
download times, then a small percentage of nodes with maliciously-
advertised download times is enough to decrease the successful
download probability to zero. On the other hand, a simple random
strategy significantly improves the successful download probabil-
ity, and the “random redundant” strategy is even more successful.
We demonstrate in Section 6 that, unfortunately, random strategies
considerably degrade the system performance in the absence of an
attack.
5.4.2 Reputation Systems
We model the impact of reputation systems on the relationship
between the successful-download and the false-reply probabilities.
We do not make any assumptions about the particular reputation
mechanism, since that is beyond the scope of this paper. We do,
however, gauge the impact of the accuracy of a potential reputa-
tion algorithm. Denote  and 

as the false-negative and false-
positive probabilities of a reputation system. The false-negative
probability is defined as the fraction of malicious nodes that are
left undetected by the reputation system, while the false-positive
probability is the fraction of non-malicious users that are falsely
declared malicious.
After receiving  replies for a single query, the user discards
all replies that are declared “malicious.” For a given false-negative
probability  , the number of correctly detected malicious replies
becomes     , while the number of falsely-detected
non-malicious replies becomes  

    . Since both
of the above two classes of replies are discarded by the reputation
system, the “effective” number of non-discarded replies,  , be-
comes


      

     

     

(13)
Not all of the remaining  replies are necessarily good. Rep-
utation systems fail to detect malicious nodes with probability  .
Hence, it can be shown that the false-reply probability under the
reputation system,   , becomes
   


  
         

    

(14)
where     denotes the corresponding false-reply probability
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in the absence of a reputation system. Finally, by replacing  and
   in Equations (9)-(12) with  and     as com-
puted above, we obtain the successful-download probability for a
given accuracy of a reputation algorithm.
Figure 6 shows the impact of a reputation system on the successful-
download probability with   

 

. The other parameters
are the same as in the previous subsection. Even with extremely
small false-detection probabilities, reputation systems are unable
to improve the performance of the “best” strategies. In essence, if
a user always chooses to download files with the best-advertised
download times, then even a small fraction of malicious nodes
that manage to “survive” the reputation system’s filter are able to
quickly degrade the successful-download probability to zero. On
the contrary, an efficient reputation algorithm further improves the
“random” strategies. Again, we demonstrate in Section 6 that such
strategies (even when combined with reputation systems) consider-
ably degrade the system performance in the absence of an attack.
6. SIMULATION STUDY
We present an extensive set of simulation experiments to explore
the key system factors that influence DoS resilience of p2p file shar-
ing systems.
6.1 Simulation Preliminaries
We implemented a discrete event simulator of a p2p file shar-
ing network with the following capabilities: (1) p2p network over-
lay maintenance, (2) query request and reply routing, (3) network
model, (4) content distribution model, (5) search query and re-
sponse processing at each node, (6) file transmission and reception,
(7) user model for download selection and initiation, (8) handling
queuing and rejection of file download requests, (9) multiple DoS
attacker behaviors, and (10) multiple counter-DoS strategies. We
elaborate on some of these factors below.
We investigated both structured and unstructured p2p overlays.
For the unstructured overlay we have implemented a Gnutella net-
work simulator, largely based on gnutellasim from limewire.org.
Requests are flooded over Gnutella’s overlay network, while replies
are routed back to the requester along the reverse path. For the
structured overlay we used FreePastry to implement the query broad-
cast facility of Structella, as described in [4]. The replies are sent
using Pastry’s usual point to point routing mechanism.
We do not model the network core and consider a scenario in
which the bandwidth bottlenecks are at client access links. As
such, we divide peers into high and low bandwidth peers, which
in Gnutella become supernodes and leaf nodes respectively. Un-
less otherwise specified, access link rates are uniformly distributed
between 56 kb/sec and 1 Mb/sec for the leaf nodes, and 1 Mb/sec
to 10 Mb/sec for the super nodes. We use a Zipf distribution to
represent file popularity and file replication. Moreover, queries are
processed at each node with the non-malicious node’s reply prob-
ability taken from a Zipf distribution of file replication, its rank
having been given in the query request. We make the simplifying
assumption that the file popularity distribution is the same as the
replication distribution.
Finally, file transmission is simulated by allocating bandwidth
according to access link speeds being max-min fairly shared among
all downloads at an endpoint. Unless otherwise indicated, the num-
ber of nodes in the system is set to 10,000. In most cases, our key
performance measures are the probability of truthful reply and the
average system goodput (rate of successful transfer of true content)
normalized to the number of non-malicious users. Each scenario is
simulated 10 times and we report averages. Due to low variance in
the output, confidence intervals are shown only in Figure 8.
6.2 Baseline Experiments
We first consider a baseline scenario for the two classes of network-
targeted attacks described in Section 4: the false-reply and the
slow node attacks. The scenario has a ratio of supernodes to non-
supernodes of 1:10. We assume that the attacker has no limit on
the number of simultaneous uploads, has high bandwidth, and re-
sponds to queries with predictions of low delay. Clients implement
no counter-DoS strategies and select peers one-at-a-time based on
their reported expected delay. All other parameters are set as de-
scribed above.
6.2.1 False Reply Attack
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Figure 7: Gnutella Fraction of Truthful Query Replies
Figure 7 shows the probability of a node receiving a truthful
reply for a Gnutella overlay with  set to the mean reply-path
length, and a TTL of 3. Note the correspondence in scaling be-
havior between the simulation and the model. For example, with
10% malicious supernodes, the simulations measure 65% proba-
bility whereas the model predicts 75%.
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Figure 8: Baseline Attack
Figure 8 depicts the effects that the attack has on system good-
put and indicates its tremendous scaling behavior characterized by
two regions. Curve fitting indicates an excellent match with a 2-
stage hyperexponential. The fast initial drop (indicated by the first
region and the first exponent) shows that even a small number of
malicious supernodes, only 0.25% of all nodes, causes the system
goodput to nearly collapse. Surprisingly, the corresponding truth-
ful reply probability in this scenario is as high as 95%. Even with
such a small percentage of false replies, the probability that the
set of replies to a query contains at least one false reply is quite
high. Because the malicious nodes advertise lower expected de-
lays than non-malicious nodes, these false replies are very likely
to get chosen. In addition, the choice of a malicious peer results
in a failed download, and one or more retries, creating a “positive
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feedback” loop that increases load and reduces goodput. Goodput
does not drop all the way to zero (indicated by the second region
and the second exponent), because there are queries for which the
user waits only long enough to receive replies from nearby nodes,
which are not malicious in every neighborhood. Finally, while we
do not show users’ delay results due to space constraints, they are
similar to goodput trends. For example, with 2.5% of malicious
supernodes, the average users’ perceived delay increases by more
than an order of magnitude.8
6.2.2 Slow Node Attack
Our results (figures not shown due to space constraints) indicate
that the slow node attack has marginal effectiveness on goodput.
While one might expect (as indeed the authors previously did) that
this attack would be effective as fast supernodes would remain un-
used while dial-up lines would become overwhelmed, the system
remains far more resilient. The key reason is that this attack lacks
the “positive feedback” of the false-reply attack. A false reply re-
sults in a failed download, which requires potentially repeated re-
tries increasing delay and load. In contrast, a slow-node reply only
results in a single download, albeit from a slow node. A secondary
factor is that while the slow node attack reduces the utilization of
non-malicious high-bandwidth supernodes, when such nodes do
transmit a file, which happens with fairly high probability, the de-
lay is quite low given their low queue length and high available
bandwidth.
Consequently, an important finding is that a successful network-
targeted attack requires system resources (bandwidth and storage)
vs. only transmitting false information (i.e., redirecting peers to the
slowest peer). Thus, attackers must either (i) invest significantly
in their own infrastructure or (ii) exploit software vulnerabilities
in order to commandeer the resources of otherwise non-malicious
peers.
6.3 System Factors
6.3.1 Overlay Structure and Hierarchy
We simulate the baseline DoS attack on systems using both a
two-level hierarchy of Gnutella and the Pastry-derived Structella
overlay networks. Figure 9 shows that the probability of receiv-
ing a truthful reply under attack is substantially higher when using
Structella, even though the average path lengths are approximately
the same (equal to 3). In the Structella scenario, approximately 5%
of the nodes must be malicious in order to degrade the probabil-
ity of truthful reply to 0.95. This is approximately 20 times the
percentage of malicious nodes needed in the Gnutella scenario to
create the same effect.
Both hierarchical and structured p2p networks aim to solve the
scalability problem by making flooding much more efficient. While
both schemes manage to do so, the two-level hierarchical approach
is far more vulnerable to DoS attacks. In a two-level hierarchy an
attacker can strategically position malicious nodes as supernodes
(as we did in our experiment). Requests and replies are routed via
supernodes, and supernodes reply to queries on behalf of their leaf
nodes, significantly increasing the probability that a query traverses
a malicious node. On the contrary, Structella is far more resilient to
DoS attacks because such strategic positioning of malicious nodes
is not possible with structured p2p networks that lack hierarchy.
In addition, Figure 10 depicts the system goodput as a function of
the fraction of malicious nodes. The goodput collapse point moves
from 0.25% of the nodes with Gnutella to approximately 5% with
8Henceforth we depict linear scales as some scenarios result in lin-
ear scaling.
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Structella. As discussed above, both of the points correspond to a
false reply probability of 0.95, which in this scenario is enough to
collapse the system goodput.
6.3.2 Path Length
In Section 5 we showed that, independent of the graph structure,
vulnerability to DoS increases with increasing path length. Below,
we quantify the percentage of malicious nodes capable of collaps-
ing the network goodput as a function of the path length.
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Figure 11: Probability of Truthful Replies for Long Paths
Figure 11 shows the system degradation with increased path length.
While in the baseline scenario the attacker needs to control 2.5%
of supernodes in order to degrade the truthful reply probability to
95%, this percentage significantly decreases with increased path
length. For example, when the average path length is 5 instead of
3, an attacker needs to control less than 1% of supernodes in order
to collapse the system goodput. Thus, while longer paths do foster
anonymous communication, they significantly increase a system’s
vulnerability to DoS attacks.
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6.4 Victim Counter Strategies
P2p users do not sit by idly when the system is under attack.
They use trial and error to find effective counter-DoS strategies
to improve their performance. Such users may invoke multiple
downloads in order to decrease their own delay, perhaps without
consideration of adverse effects on others’ performance. Conse-
quently, we consider a number of parallel download and random-
ization techniques. In addition, we evaluate to what extent a repu-
tation system can improve the system resiliency to DoS attacks.
6.4.1 Best Redundant Download
We first consider parallel downloads of a file from the set of N
best advertised files.
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Figure 12: Best Redundant Download
Figure 12 indicates that the best redundant strategy offers no sig-
nificant resilience against attack. The “N-best” strategy is still sig-
nificantly thwarted by false information. Indeed, if a user always
chooses to download one or more copies of a file with the best-
advertised download times, then even a small percentage of ma-
licious nodes is enough to degrade the system performance. The
key insight from the figure is that the above scheme introduces a
substantial goodput penalty for transferring multiple copies of files
in parallel, even under no attack, due to wasted resources until the
first transfer completes.
6.4.2 Random Redundant Downloads
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Figure 13: Random Single and Redundant Downloads
On one hand, when clients select randomly among replies, the
false resource information supplied by attackers is ignored. Hence,
attackers cannot attract clients by claiming to have low queues or
high-speed access links. On the other hand, randomization implies
that clients must ignore performance-related information attached
to query replies forcing them to select a less-than-optimal choice,
even if avoiding the attacker. Moreover, randomization does not
preclude a client from selecting a malicious peer, it merely de-
creases the probability of it occurring.
These combined effects are illustrated in Figure 13. Consider
first the case of a single random selection (the curve labeled rand1).
Without attack, random selection results in a 72% decrease in good-
put compared to the best-peer selection policy in the absence of at-
tack. The attack scales, however, quite poorly, without the sharp
knee that characterizes the baseline attack. Redundant download
with a small redundancy factor increases the goodput, because it
provides better protection against false information. With larger re-
dundancy factors goodput decreases, because of the extra load in-
flicted on the system by the increasing number of redundant trans-
fers.
6.4.3 Reputation Systems
Finally, we evaluate the impact of the accuracy of a reputation
mechanism, focusing on the false-negative probability (fraction of
malicious nodes undetected by the reputation system). This is be-
cause our model (e.g., Equation (14)) predicts that this probability
dominantly impacts the resilience to DoS attacks in the presence of
reputation systems.
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Figure 14: Reputation System and Best Selection Policy
Figure 14 shows the system goodput in a scenario in which the
users apply the best selection policy, while the false-negative prob-
ability varies from 1% to 20%. Indeed, in the presence of reputation
systems, the clients might feel confident to download files with the
best advertised delay. The shape of the curves in the presence of the
reputation system in Figure 14 is quite similar to the baseline curve
where no reputation system is applied. Unlike other client counter
measures, here the best system performance is retained in the ab-
sence of an attack. However, in the presence of malicious nodes,
the system performance significantly degrades. While the perfor-
mance is not as poor as in the baseline scenario, it is far from ideal.
For example, when the percentage of malicious supernodes is as
small as 2.5%, and the false-negative probability of the reputation
system is only 1%, system goodput degrades to about 32% when
compared to the no-attack case. If a user always downloads files
with the best advertised times, then a small number of malicious
nodes can degrade system performance, even when the reputation
system is highly accurate.9 As the percentage of malicious nodes
increases, the positive effects of the reputation system start to fade,
as predicted by our model.
Thus, given that reputation systems alone are insufficient to iso-
late the network from the attack, clients may start applying random-
ization as another level of protection. Figure 15 shows the com-
9While it may appear possible to build a perfect reputation system,
the malicious nodes can apply many counter-measures (e.g., often
change identity or occasionally upload a non-polluted copy of a
file) to keep the false-negatives and positives non-zero.
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Figure 15: Reputation System and Random Selection Policy
bined effects of the two counter-DoS strategies. While the good-
put performance under attack is indeed improved, it is still far be-
low the best achievable goodput, which is 185 kb/s in this scenario.
Moreover, due to randomization, system performance is inevitably
degraded in the absence of an attack.
7. CONCLUSIONS
We analyzed DoS attacks against both popular files and entire
p2p file sharing systems. We produced an extensive set of ana-
lytical models and simulations, and our findings are as follows. (i)
File-targeted (pollution) attacks applied in today’s p2p networks are
largely inefficient in cooperative p2p environments due to scalabil-
ity limitations; the main reasons for their current success are that
clients do not share files, do not remove corrupted files, or quickly
give up when the system is under attack. (ii) To launch a successful
attack against a p2p network, it is insufficient to only transmit false
information; the attackers must either invest in their own infrastruc-
ture or exploit software vulnerabilities in order to commandeer the
resources of otherwise non-malicious peers. (iii) Structured p2p
systems are more resilient than hierarchical p2p systems as the ad-
ditional protocol functionality of nodes in the first-level of the hi-
erarchy provides an acute DoS vulnerability. (iv) In both cases,
system goodput degrades tremendously (hyperexponentially fast)
with the number of malicious nodes, when users select to down-
load files from the peer with best-advertised download time. (v)
Reputation systems are largely ineffective, even with a very small
number of false negatives. (vi) Randomization techniques are in-
deed able to transform the system’s resilience from a devastating
hyperexponential scaling to a more resilient linear scaling. Un-
fortunately, randomization severely hinders performance when no
attackers are present.
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